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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Did the Ninth Circuit err by concluding that the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996 is content-based, rather than content-neutral, based upon its
secondary effects to prevent the abuse of children and the proliferation of the
child pornography market?

2.

If the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 is held to be content-based, is
the statute narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government interest in
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of children and the
termination of the child pornography market, under a strict scrutiny standard?

3.

Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 is overbroad, while the material covered by the statute will largely include
sexually explicit images of pre-pubescent children, and that any overbreadth can
be cured on a case-by-case basis?

4.

Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 is void for vagueness even though it gives a person of reasonable
intelligence adequate notice and enforcement is based on objective standards?

5.

Should First Amendment protection extend to virtual child pornography, which is
an obscene form of speech that has no social value?
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No. 00-795

In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Fall Term of2001

John Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al..
Petitioner,
V.

The Free Speech Coalition, et al..
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, the Attorney General of the United States, respectftilly submit this brief and
request that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit that the language “appears to be a minor” and the language “conveys the
impression” is unconstitutional and should be severed from the statute.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United Slates Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 198
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Elder v. Holloway. 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On January 27, 1997, The Free Speech Coalition on its own behalf and on the behalf of
its members. Bold Type, Inc., Jim Gingerich and Ron Raffaelli (“The Free Speech Coalition”),
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, for
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996
( CPPA ). (J.A. 1.) The Free Speech Coalition is a trade association that represents more than
600 businesses and individuals involved in the production, distribution, sale and presentation of
adult oriented materials. (J.A. 3.) Bold Type, Inc. is a publisher of a book entitled “California’s
Nude Beaches, a publication “dedicated to the education and expression of the ideals and
philosophy associated with nudism.” (J.A. 3.) Jim Gingerich is a New York artist whose
paintings include large-scale nudes; and Ron Raffaelli is a professional photographer
specializing in erotic photography. (J.A. 3.)
The Respondents filed suit in the Northern District of California asserting a pre
enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A, 2256. (J.A. 70.) The Free Speech Coalition
alleged that these provisions were vague, overbroad and constituted impermissible contentspecific regulations and prior restraints on free speech. (J.A. 70.) Both parties, then moved for
summary Judgment. (J.A. 70.) However, on August 12,1997, the district court granted the
government’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the Act was consistent with the
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First Amendment. (J.A. 85.) The district court held that the CPPA was content-neutral and not
content-specific and therefore did not intend to regulate speech because of government
disagreement with the message being conveyed. (J.A. 76.) The CPPA was instead passed to
prevent the secondary effects of the child pornography industry, including the “exploitation and
degradation of children and the encouragement of pedophilia and molestation of children.” (J.A.
76.) The court also found that the CPPA was not vague or overbroad, and did not constitute an
improper prior restraint on speech. (J.A. 81-84.) Finally, the district court also found that the
CPPA’s affirmative defense did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to a defendant by
virtue of an unconstitutional presumption. (J.A. 83.) The district court, therefore, denied the
Free Speech Coalition’s cross motion for summary judgment. (J.A. 85.)
On August 13, 1997, the Free Speech Coalition, appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from this final judgment. (J.A. 87.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed in
part on the questions of standing and prior restraint. (J.A. 10.) The judgment was reversed on
the questions of unconstitutionality of the statutory language “appears to be a minor” and
“conveys the impression”. (J.A. 10.) The case was therefore remanded to the district court on
December 17, 1999. (J.A. 10.) The Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court on November 16, 2000. (J.A. 114.) This Court granted certiorari
on January 22, 2001. (J.A. 114.)
Statement of the Facts
For more than two decades, Congress has enacted and amended legislation designed to
eliminate the scourge of child pornography by prohibiting the possession, production and
distribution of materials depicting children in a sexually explicit manner. (J.A. 49.) The history
of this effort, however, had been plagued with examples of child pomographers finding
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loopholes within the legislation so that they would not be prosecuted. (J.A. 49.) To close these
loopholes, the original federal legislation has been amended many times since it was enacted as
the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977. The Free Speech Coalition,
et al. V. Reno, et al.. 198 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999). The original act was passed to
criminalize the production of child pornography. Yet, the legislation had many problems,
considering that only one person was ever convicted under the Act’s production prohibition. W.
Congress subsequently passed the Child Protection Act of 1984, which expanded the
1977 Act. Id. at 1088. The expansion was a consequence of the 1977 Act’s deficiencies and as a
response to the Supreme Court ruling in New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Supreme
Court held in this case that child pornography would not have to meet the Miller obscenity
standard to be prohibited. Id at 747. Essentially, the Court decided that the compelling interest
in protecting children would almost always outweigh First Amendment interests, thereby
justifying a categorical denial of First Amendment protection to child pornography in most cases.
Id at 748.
Therefore, the 1984 amendment codified the Ferber rule that child pornography need not
meet the obscenity standard The Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1087. The Child Protection
Act also raised the age limit for protecting children involved from sixteen years to eighteen
years. Id The 1984 statute also did away with the requirement that the material have to be for
the purpose of sale. The Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1087. Finally, the act imposed
F^rber’s "visual depiction" language, thereby greatly extending the reach of the anti-child
pornography statute. Id In the 1980s, Congress made two additional amendments to the statute
that further extended its reach to the advertisement of child pornography and the use of computer
technology for the transportation of child pornography. Id
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The 1990s brought some of the most significant strides in the crusade against child
pornography. The Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1087. Following the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Osborne v. Ohio. Congress further toughened the statute, making the
possession of three or more pieces of child pornography a federal crime in the Child Protection
Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990. W. The principal holding in Osborne v.
Ohio sustained a state statute banning even possession or viewing of child pornography on the
basis of the state’s compelling interest in maintaining the physical and emotional safety of
children, and ultimately eradicating the child pornography market. 496 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
Tliere were more changes to the statute in 1994, including punishment for the production and
importation of sexually explicit depictions of a minor and restitution for victims. The Free
Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1088-89.
Legislation has therefore tracked Supreme Court decisions and the swift development of
technology and its infinite possibilities. Id. In recent years, computer technology has given yet
another loophole to pomographers so that they may create synthetic child pornography that is
virtually indistinguishable from real child pornography. (J.A. 49.) Congress considered
extensive testimony and documents and found that there is a link between computer-generated
child pornography, of such quality that it is indistinguishable from a depiction of an actual child,
and harm to children. (J.A. 71.) Therefore, on September 30, 1996, the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”), was enacted to address the Government’s ongoing fight
against child pornography. (J.A. 70.) This Act amends Title 18, Chapter 110 of the United
States Code by adding section 2252A. (J.A. 26.) The Act also revised section 2251, 2252, and
2256. Congress passed this legislation, because it recognized that the danger of child
pornography is not limited to the effects on children actually used in the pornography. (J.A. 71.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
because the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 does not violate the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution. The CPPA is content-neutral and does not violate judicial
standards of overbreadth and vagueness. The CPPA constitutes a content-neutral statute because
it is designed to prevent the secondary effects of child pornography on children. The CPPA
advances substantial government interests in aiming to safeguard the physical and psychological
well-being of children. Moreover, despite the CPPA’s regulation of child pornography, the
CPPA reasonably permits alternative avenues of communication.
Even if the CPPA is content-based, compelling government interests Justify the act under
a standard of strict scrutiny. Consequently, the CPPA is narrowly tailored in the least restrictive
means possible to advance compelling government interests. In addition, this Court has never
held that the government’s interest in regulating child pornography is limited to visual depictions
of real children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision stands
in stark contrast to the decisions holding the CPPA constitutional from the First, Fourth, Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits.
The prevention of the sexual exploitation of children, resulting from child pornography,
constitutes a substantial and compelling government interest. The Ninth Circuit erred by holding
that compelling and substantial government interests exist only when child pornography contains
images of actual children. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit failed to give proper deference to
Congressional findings. In adopting the CPPA, Congress aims to regulate visual depictions of
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct virtually indistinguishable from pornography
depicting real children in sexually explicit conduct.
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The CPPA is not substantially overbroad in light of the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. The
“appears to be” and “conveys the impression” language of the CPPA is narrowly aimed at
regulating images that are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from photographs
of actual children engaged in identical sexual conduct. In light of the CPPA’s legitimate aim in
regulating real and virtual child pornography, the possibility of educational, medical or artistic
works falling within the statute’s reach is minimal as these circumstances will be cured by a
case-by-case analysis. In fact, the affirmative defense and scienter requirement of the CPPA
illustrate Congress’s intention to narrowly regulate only the images indistinguishable from
images depicting actual children.
The CPPA is not void under the First Amendment because of vagueness. Not only does
the CPPA provide adequate notice, it provides for objective enforcement by law enforcement.
The CPPA defines the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness in that an ordinary person can
understand what conduct is prohibited. Additionally, the CPPA does not encourage arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement because an objective standard will be applied in determining
whether visual depictions violate the CPPA. Moreover, the scienter requirement and the
affirmative defense provide protections against arbitrary enforcement by authorities.
Consequently, this Court should find the CPPA constitutional under the First Amendment in
recognizing that the sexual exploitation of children is a real threat to the well-being of America’s
children.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT OF 1996 IS CONTENTNEUTRAL BECAUSE IT ADVANCES SUBSTANTIAL GOVERNMENT
INTERESTS WITHOUT UNREASONABLY LIMITTING ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF COMMUNICATION.
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 expands the government’s efforts in

combating the use of computer technology to produce child pornography containing images
virtually indistinguishable from real children. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. section 2256(8)(B) bans
visual depictions that appear to be minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and section
2256(8)(D) bans visual depictions advertised, promoted, presented, described or distributed in
such a manner that conveys the impression that the materials contain sexually explicit images of
children. Accordingly, a federal statute that regulates child pornography must pass constitutional
muster under the guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court. That inquiry requires a
determination of whether this reguFtion is content-neutral or content-based. As a contentneutral regulation, the CPPA passes constitutional bars.
The CPPA Is Content-Neutral Because It Is Designed To Prevent The Secondary
Effects Of Child Pornography On Children.
A federal regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is
content-neutral despite any incidental effects on speakers and messages. Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Accordingly, the principal inquiry focuses on whether the
government adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys. Id. “The government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner
of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
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that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Ward.
491 U.S.at791.
This Coux i upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance aimed at preventing the secondary
effects associated with sexually explicit material in City of Renton, et al. v. Playtime Theatres.
Inc., et al.. 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986). In Renton, a zoning ordinance prohibited adult motion
picture theatres from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone including family
dwelling, church, park or school. Id at 43. Reversing the decision of the Ninth Circuit, this
Court held that the ordinance was not aimed at the content of the films shown at the theatres but
at the secondary effects of such theaters in preventing crime, protecting the quality of the city’s
neighborhoods and preserving the quality of urban life. Id at 47-48. Moreover, this Court
upheld the constitutionality of a similar city zoning ordinance regulating the location of adult
motion picture theatres in Young, et al. v. American Mini Theatres. Inc., et al.. 427 U.S. 50, 7172 (1976). This Court held that zoning ordinances designed to prevent the secondary effects of a
business catering in sexually explicit materials constitute a content-neutral regulation. Id at 63.
Here, this Court should conclude that the CPPA constitutes a content-neutral regulation
because Congress is regulating sexually explicit material in order to combat secondary effects.
In passing the CPPA, Congress attempted to regulate a subcategory of pornography not to
suppress the expression of unpopular views but to prevent the secondary effects of child
pornography.

Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2 (Aug. 27, 1996). If the CPPA targets child

pornography, it is due to the effect of the pornography on innocent children, not the nature of the
materials themselves, especially if that pornography contains computer-generated images of
children.

id Congress foimd that “child pornography is often used as part of a method of

seducing other children into sexual activity,” and that “child pornography is often used by
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pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate their own sexual appetites.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358,
at 2. Furthermore, the effect of visual depictions of child sexual activity on child molesters,
pedophiles or innocent children “is the same whether the child pornography consists of
photographic depictions of actual children or visual depictions ... which are virtually
indistinguishable ... from photographic images of actual children.” Id. Hence, in adopting the
CPPA, Congress endeavored to protect “the physical and mental health, safety and well-being of
our children” from the serious threat of child pornography. Id. at 7. Therefore, in serving to
curb the secondary effects of child pornography on children, the CPPA represents a contentneutral regulation as a reasonable restriction on the time, place and manner of pornography
without reference to its content.
Congress enacted the CPPA to combat the correlation between child pornography and the
sexual exploitation of children, id. at 2. The CPPA focuses on how child abusers use child
pornography to seduce children and how child abusers use child pornography to learn sexually
deviant behavior. Id. Moreover, the CPPA focuses on the secondary effect of actual physical
harm to a child from the use of child pornography. Id. Congress’s findings concern the
secondary effects of child pornography rather than the direct impact of child pornography.
Hence, the prevention of secondary effects renders the CPPA content-neutral.
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit erred by holding that the CPPA represented a contentbased classification of speech aimed at curbing a particular category of expression. The district
court found that Congress passed the CPPA in order to prevent the secondary effects of the child
pornography industry, including the exploitation and degradation of children and the
encouragement of pedophilia and molestation of children. The Free Speech Coalition, et al. v.
Reno, ct al.. 198 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999). The failure of the Ninth Circuit to recognize
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Congress’s purpose in adopting the CPPA signifies a lack of concern towards the government’s
substantial interest in protecting children from the secondary effects of child pornography.
Therefore, this Court should conclude chat Congress passed the CPPA to prevent the secondary
effects of child pornography.
B.

As A Content-Neutral Regulation. The CPPA Is Narrowly Tailored To Advance
Substantial Government Interests In Aiming To Safeguard The Physical And
Psychological Well-Being Of Children.

Once a court deems a regulation content-neutral, the inquiry turns to whether the
regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. Ward. 491 U.S. at 791.
“A content neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances
important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden
substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.” Turner Broadcasting
System. Inc., et al. v. FCC. et al.. 520 U.S. 180,189 (1997). A statute will meet the narrowly
tailored requirement if a substantial portion of the burden it imposes furthers the government’s
interest, even though a less intrusive alternative might also exist. American Library Assn., et al.
V.

Reno. 33 F.3d 78, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Although the effects of a content-neutral regulation

may be substantial, if they are incidental and largely unavoidable, they will pass constitutional
muster. Id. at 87-88. This requirement is met so long as the regulation promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. U.S. v.
Albertini. 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). In addition, the mere assertion of possible self-censorship
resulting from a statute fails to render an antiobscenity law unconstitutional. Fort Wayne Books.
Inc, v. Ind.. 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989).
This Court upheld the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that prohibited the possession
or yiewing of child pornography because the utilization of child pornography in order to seduce
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children constituted a secondary effect. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). Relying on
the findings of the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, this Court held that
regulating child pornography represents a compelling government interest because pedophiles
use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.” Id. As in Osborne, the
CPPA regulates child pornography to serve government interests. In adopting the CPPA,
Congress found that “child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing other
children into sexual activity.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2. Hence, the CPPA protects children from
the sexual abuse and exploitation of children.
The govemmenf s interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
minor constitutes a substantial government interest, even a compelling interest. New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982). This Court sustained legislation aimed at protecting the
physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the law operated in the sensitive area of
constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 757. In Ferber. this Court upheld the constitutionality of
a New York criminal statute that prohibited persons from knowingly promoting and distributing
materials depicting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen without a showing
of obscenity. Id. at 749. Secondly, this Court held that the distribution of photographs and films
depicting sexual activity by juveniles intrinsically relates to the sexual abuse of children. Id. at
759. Thirdly, this Court held that to further prevent the production of child pornography the
advertising and selling, effectively the market, of child pornography must be eradicated. Id. at
761. Finally, this Court held that the value of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 762. These substantial interests
justified New York’s regulation of child pornography.
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I

Here, the CPPA endorses the same justifications that this Court deemed dispositive in
upholding the constitutionality of New York’s regulation in Ferber. Congressional findings
Justify the CPPA’s prohibitions of real and virtual child pornography with substantial
government interests. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2. Specifically, Congress found that child
pornography, whether utilizing real or virtual children in sexually explicit conduct, is used to
seduce other children to participate m sexually explicit activity. Id. Child pornography can
convince a reluctant child to engage in sexual activity with an adult or to pose for sexually
explicit photographs. Id. Also, sexually explicit conduct of real or virtual children stimulates
and whets the sexual appetites of pedophiles and child abusers. W. Child pornography
desensitizes a viewer to the pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation of children. Id. Therefore,
after weighing the evidence, Congress concluded that computer-generated children depicted in
sexually explicit conduct posed just as viable a threat to the sexual exploitation of children as
real children involved in sexually explicit conduct. Id. Thus, Congress determined that the
physical and psychological well-being of children represents a substantial, indeed compelling,
interest.
These substantial and even compelling interests illustrate that child pornography, whether
utilizing virtual or real children, is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children. In a child
pornography case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the defendant “used his computer to expose
his child victims to various sexual stimulants to lure them into sexual activities and pornography
production.” U.S. v. Reaves, 253 F.3d 1201,1203 (10th Cir. 2001). Defendant showed his child
victims sexually explicit imagery both before and after their participation in sexually explicit
conduct fully expecting that such pemographic images would entice his victims to engage in this
illicit sexual conduct with each other or with him. Reaves> 253 F.3d at 1203. In another child
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pornography case, the defendant allowed his child victims access to his computer to view other
children in sexual situations. U.S. v. Brown. 237 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit
concluded “in using the computer to desensitize his victims to deviant sexual activity, he was
using it to solicit participation in that activity.” Id. at 629. Hence, Congress enacted the CPPA
to address the documented concern that child pornography intrinsically relates to the sexual
abuse of children. Sen. Rpt 104-358, at 2.
Furthermore, Congress enacted the CPPA to destroy the network and market of child
pornography. Congress concluded that the elimination of child pornography necessarily includes
the elimination of the distribution network for child pornography. Id at 20. This Court held that
states are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children
because “the advertising and selling of child pornography provide[sl an economic motive for and
[is] thus an integral part of the production of such materials.” Ferber. 458 U.S. at 761. Hence,
the market for child pornography plays a critical role in the vicious cycle of child sexual abuse
and exploitation whether utilizing real or computer-generated children in sexually explicit
conduct. The CPPA also serves to update federal law to keep pace with the technology of
pornography. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 20. Pedophiles who possess pornographic depictions of
actual children will go free from punishment by statutes prohibiting the possession of child
pornography produced using actual children due to the government’s inability to detect or prove
the use of real children in the production of child pornography. Id. Thus, the enforcement of
existing laws against the sexual exploitation of children requires the adoption of the CPPA.
Moreover, the CPPA represents a narrowly tailored statute serving significant
governmental interests. The district court held that the CPPA burdens no more speech than
necessary in order to protect children from the harms of child pornography. The Free Speech
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Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1095-96. For example, the CPPA specifically defines sexually explicit
conduct and child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000). The affirmative defense allowed
under the CPPA resolves any ambiguity regarding the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the
impression.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000). The affirmative defense limits the scope of the
CPPA by removing from its range of criminal behavior the exact type of activity in which
plaintiffs claim to engage. The Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1086-87. Works that do not
involve actual children and are not marketed or advertised as works featuring sexually explicit
conduct by children lay beyond the scope of the CPPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c). Congress
intended that the CPPA not apply to depictions produced using adults engaging in sexually
explicit conduct even though they may appear to be a minor. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 21. Thus, the
CPPA regulates the narrowest range of materials that might fall within its scope.
C.

The CPPA's Regulation Of Child Pornography Reasonably Permits Alternative
Avenues Of Communication.

A content-neutral regulation must not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication. City of Renton, et al. v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., et al., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986).
In order to permit adequate avenues of expression, a regulation must permit alternative methods
of disseminating or possessing the material in question. U.S. v. Hilton. 167 F.3d 61,69 (1st Cir.
1999). Here, the CPPA permits alternative channels of communication. Although the CPPA
prohibits the possession of child pornography utilizing real or virtual children, the affirmative
defense allowed under the CPPA leaves open acceptable alternatives. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c).
Pornography that utilizes actual adults that appear to be minors escapes the reach of the CPPA as
long as the material was not marketed as child pornography. W. Given the de minimis value of
child pornography, adult pornography constitutes a reasonable alternative avenue of
communication as long as not obscene. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 762.
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D.

The Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit Erred By Holding That Compelling
Government Interests Exist Only When Child Pornography Contains Images Of
Actual Children.

The Court of Appeals for th'^ Ninth Circuit erred by failing to give legitimate recognition
to the compelling governmental interests that justify the CPPA. The Ninth Circuit held under the
rationale of Ferber that Congress’s compelling interest in regulating child pornography is
narrowly limited to sexually explicit materials containing visual images of actual children. The
Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1092. “Ferber considered the possibility of simulations of
sexually explicit acts involving non-recognizable minors and implicitly found them to be
constitutionally protected.” Id. This is an incorrect conclusion. Preventing the sexual abuse and
exploitation of real children is not the sole justification for Congress’s criminalization of child
pornography.
Ferber indicates that the government’s interest in regulating child pornography is much
broader than as the Ninth Circuit held. In Ferber, this Court held that “the prevention of the
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing
importance.” 458 U.S. at 757. Ferber did nothing more than place child pornography on the
same level of First Amendment protection as obscene adult pornography, meaning that its
production and distribution could be proscribed. Osborne. 495 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens. Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158,
168(1944). Furthermore, this Court never explicitly addressed the issue regarding computer
generated children. In fact, at the time of Ferber. the technology to produce visual depictions of
child sexual activity indistinguishable from photographs of actual children engaging in sexual
activity did not exist in 1982. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 21. This Court only addressed real children
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involved in child pornography because the respondent sold two films to an undercover police
officer depicting actual boys masturbating. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 752. The Ninth Circuit misplaced
the majority’s reliance on the dicta in Ferber hinting at the statute’s limitation to real children.
This Court wrote that live performances including films, photographs and other visual
reproductions retained First Amendment protection to prevent works such as sculptures,
paintings, drawings and cartoons depicting young persons in sexually explicit conduct from
coming within the scope of the statute. Id. at 765. Hence, this Court made no implicit or explicit
holdings regarding the regulation of virtual child pornography.
This Court’s reasoning in Osborne and Ferber justified child pornography regulation in
order to protect children from sexual abuse and exploitation. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109; Ferber.
458 U.S. at 757. The CPPA justifiably regulates child pornography in order to protect children
from sexual abuse and exploitation. The CPPA aims to prevent the sexual exploitation and
seduction of real children. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2. To a minor or child abuser, it is irrelevant
whether the minor is viewing actual children or computer-generated children participating in
sexually explicit conduct. Id. The danger to actual children who are seduced and molested with
the aid of child pornography is just as great whether utilizing actual or virtual children.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit stands alone in holding the CPPA unconstitutional against
decisions of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. See U.S. v. Fox. 248 F.3d 394,404
(5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912,915 (4lh Cir. 2000); Hilton. 167 F.3d at 65; U.S. v.
Acheson. 195 F.3d 645,648 (11th Cir. 1999). The First Circuit held that the CPPA represents “a
logical and permissible extension of the rationales in Ferber and Osborne to allow the regulation
of sexual materials that appear to be of children but did not, in fact, involve the use of live
children in their production.” Hilton. 167 F.3d at 73. The Fourth Circuit held that the
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government’s interest in stamping out child pornography and denying child abusers access
extends beyond the protection of the children actually involved in making the pornography.
Mento. 231 F.3d at 920. “The government instead aspires to shield all children from sexual
exploitation resulting from child pornography.” Id.
E.

The Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit Failed To Give Proper Deference To
Congressional Findings.

The Ninth Circuit ignored factual studies that provided evidence for Congress’s findings.
In fact, the Ninth Circuit independently concluded that factual studies do not yet exist
establishing a link between computer-generated child pornography and the subsequent sexual
abuse of children. The Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1093. Instead, the Ninth Circuit
relied on a single law review article rather than on the well-researched findings of Congress. In
reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, courts must accord substantial deference to the
judgments of Congress. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al. v. FCC. et al.. 520 U.S. 180,
195 (1997). A court’s sole obligation is to assure that, in formulating its judgments. Congress
drew reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence. Id. A court owes Congress’s findings
deference in part because the institution is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and
evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions. Id. In addition, courts owe
Congress’s findings an additional measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exercise
the legislative power. Id at 196. Even when the resulting regulation touches on First
Amendment concerns, a court must give considerable deference in examining the evidence to
Congress’s findings and conclusions. Id. at 199. A fundamental principle of legislation holds
that Congress is under no obligation to wait until the entire harm occurs but may act to prevent it.
Id. at 212. Furthermore, the possibility of drawing inconsistent conclusions from the evidence
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does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence. American Textile
Mftrs. Institute. Inc, v. Donovan. 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981).
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit failed to determine whether Congress drew reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence. Ignoring Congress’s findings altogether, the Ninth
Circuit replaced Congress’s judgments with its own. In Turner, this Court held that a court is not
to reweigh the evidence de novo or to replace Congress’s factual predictions with its own. 520
U.S. at 210. In Ferber. this Court refused to second-guess the legislative findings regarding the
secondary effects of child pornography. 458 U.S. at 758. Here, substantial evidence reasonably
supports Congress’s findings. Numerous experts and professionals addressed Congress
regarding the issue of child pornography: Mrs. Dee Jepsen, Dr. Victor Cline, Dr. Shirley
O’Brien, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Di Gregory, Mr. Taylor. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 1318. “The best evidence to date suggests that most or all sexual deviations are learned behavior”
where child molesters and pedophiles use child pornography as a training manual. Id. at 13. Dr.
O’Brien found a direct relationship existing between pornographic literature and the sexual
molestation of young children because viewing child pornography desensitizes the child and
molester. Id. Dr. Cline testified that computer-generated child pornography creates customtailored pornography which heightens the material’s effect on viewers and subsequently
increases the threat posed to children. Id, at 16. In 1996, Dr. Cline wrote that to sexual
predators, the effect is the same whether the child pornography consists of photographic
depictions of actual children or depictions produced wholly or in part by computer. Id, at 17.
From this expert testimony. Congress reasonably concluded that child pornography, whether
utilizing actual or virtual children, poses a significant threat against the safety of children.
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11.

EVEN IF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT OF 1996 IS CONTENTBASED, COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTERESTS JUSTIFY THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT UNDER A STANDARD OF STRICT
SCRUTINY.
“Any restriction on speech, the application of which turns on the content of the speech, is

a content-based restriction regardless of the motivation that lies behind it.” Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988). If a regulation on speech expressly aims to curb a particular category
of expression by singling out that type of expression based on its content, then that regulation is
content-based. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 68. Blanket suppression of an entire category of speech
represents, by its very nature, a content-discriminating act. Id. Even if this Court holds that the
CPPA is content-based, however, the CPPA still passes constitutional muster because
compelling government interests justify its restrictions on child pornography.
A.

Under A Standard Of Strict Scrutiny. The CPPA Advances Compellina
Government Interests.

A content-based restriction on speech remains constitutional only if the regulation
represents a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling governmental interest. Consolidated
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc, v. PSC of N.Y.. 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980). For a content-based statute
to be constitutional, therefore, one or more compelling state interests must justify the enactment
of the statute. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 68. A content-based statute must pass a standard of strict
scrutiny in order to be constitutional. Boos. 485 U.S. at 321. “It is not rare that a content-based
classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that
vrithin the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly
outweighs the expressive interests.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763. Moreover, the same governmental
interests that justify the constitutionality of a content-based statute constitute the same
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governmental interests that justify the constitutionality of a content-neutral statute. Hence, the
CPPA advances compelling government interests that justify its regulation of child pornography.
The First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits correctly held that the CPPA advances
compelling government interests. In Hilton, the First Circuit held that under the reasoning of
Osborne “stamping out child pornography” and “denying pedophiles and would be child abusers
access to child pornography” constitute compelling government interests. 167 F.3d at 70.
Moreover, “considerations beyond preventing the direct abuse of actual children can qualify as
compelling government objectives where child pornography is concerned.” Id. The
government’s interest in safeguarding the welfare of children against virtual child pornography is
compelling. Id, at 73. The First Circuit recognized that virtual pornography can be bought, sold
or traded like real child pomographv and can be used just as effectively in enticing children as
real child pornography. Id, In Mento. the Fourth Circuit held that the CPPA “aspires to shield
all children from sexual exploitation resulting from child pornography, and that interest is indeed
compelling.” 231 F.3dat920. The Fourth Circuit recognized that the connection between
virtual child pornography and the sexual abuse of children represents just as powerful an interest
as the causal link that justifies the utter prohibition of pornographic images involving actual
children. Id,
The Fifth Circuit held that Ferber and Osborne, decided long before the specter of virtual
child pornography appeared, in no way limited the government’s interests in the area of child
pornography to the prevention of only the harm suffered by the actual children who participate in
the production of pornography. Fox, 248 F.3d at 402. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the CPPA because the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance. Acheson. 195 F.3d at 650. The
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Eleventh Circuit held that “defining child pornography in a manner which captures images that
‘appear to be’ minors engaged in sexually explicit activity serves the two goals of the Act which
are the elimination of child pornography and the protection of children from sexual exploitation.”
Acheson. 195 F.3d at 649. Thus, the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits held that the
CPPA advances compelling govenLnent interests in aiming to safeguard the physical and
psychological well-being of children.
This Court held that the government’s interest in safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of children constitutes a compelling interest. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 75657. In Ferber, this Court also held that regulating the distribution, advertising and selling of
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles constitutes a compelling interest in
protecting the well-being of children. Id. at 759, 761. In Osborne, this Court held that
prohibiting the mere possession and viewing of child pornography constitutes a compelling
interest in protecting the well-being of children against the use of child pornography to seduce
children. 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). Hence, the government’s interest in driving child
pornography from the market through aggressive anti-trafficking laws and prohibiting private
possession and personal viewing remains justified. Id, Congress’s power to remedy only the
abuse of children during the process used to produce traditional forms of child pornography
extends beyond such a limitation. Thus, the CPPA’s prohibition of possession and viewing of
virtual child pornography constitutes a compelling interest in protecting the well-being of
children.
The CPPA aims to protect the well-being of children against sexual exploitation and
abuse from pedophiles and child abusers. Logically, the compelling interest of protecting
children from sexual exploitation and abuse includes preventing the use of virtual child

22

pornography to stimulate the sexual appetites of pedophiles and child abusers. Sen. Rpt. 104358, at 3. This interest includes preventing the seduction or coercion of children into sexual
activity from the use of virtual child pornography. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 73. This interest includes
destroying the network and market for virtual and real child pornography. Id at 70. This
interest includes solving the problem of prosecution in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a
pornographic image utilized a real child. Id at 73. Congress found that these compelling
government interests justify the CPPA’s prohibition on pornographic images that appear to be
minors and convey the impression of minors. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2. Therefore, the CPPA
advances compelling government interests that justify its regulation of child pornography.
B.

The CPPA Is Narrowly Tailored In The Least Restrictive Means Possible To
Advance Compelling Government Interests.

In order to pass constitutional muster, a content-based regulation must be narrowly
tailored in advancing compelling government interests. City of Renton, et al. v. Playtime
Theatres. Inc., et al.. 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986). Congress may regulate protected speech to
promote compelling governmental interests so long as h selects the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest. Sable Communications of Cal.. Inc, v. FCC. 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989). Here, the provisions of the CPPA are narrowly tailored. Congress’s statements clearly
limit the “appear to be” and “conveys the impression” language of the CPPA to visual depictions
virtually indistinguishable from photographs of actual children engaging in sexually explicit
conduct. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2. This intent excludes drawings, cartoons, sculptures and
paintings depicting children in sexually explicit conduct from the reach of the CPPA.
Furthermore, the CPPA specifically defines sexually explicit conduct and child pornography. 18
U.S.C. § 2256 (2000). The CPPA’s affirmative defense further limits the reach of the CPPA to
child pornography that utilizes real or virtual children in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. §
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2252A(c) (2000). These regulations represent the least restrictive means possible of advancing
the government’s compelling interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation and abuse.
Thus, the CPPA aims to prohibit visual depictions of children engaging in sexually explicit
conduct that is virtually indistinguishable from actual children engaging in sexually explicit
conduct. Sen. Rpt 104-358, at 2.
III.

THE CPPA IS NOT OVERBROAD AND WILL NOT HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT
BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE’S LEGITIMATE SWEEP TO SAFEGUARD THE
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN.
The conclusion that the CPPA of 1996 is a content-neutral statute, aimed at preventing

the secondary effects emanating from child pornography, does not end the inquiry into the
CPPA’s constitutionality. ‘’An otherwise constitutional statute may nonetheless violate the First
Amendment if it is ‘overbroad’ i.e., if it ‘criminalizes an intolerable range of constitutionally
protected conduct.’” Osborne. 495 U.S. at 112. However, the CPPA does not criminalize an
intolerable range of protected speech. The CPPA merely extends the existing prohibitions on
“real” child pornography to a narrow class of computer-generated pictures that are easily
mistaken for real photographs of real children. The Free Speech Coalition, et al. v. Reno, et al.,
198 F.3d 1083, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999).
A.

The Statute’s Plainly Legitimate Sweep To Stop The Child Pornography Trade
And Subsequent Child Abuse Overrides Anv Qverbreadth Problems.

The overbreadth doctrine should only be used, “as a last resort, and we must construe the
statute, if at all possible, to avoid constitutional problems.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 613 (1973). In this case, Oklahoma state employees sought a declaration that a state statute
regulating political activity by state employees, was invalid. Id. at 601. The Court held that the
statute was not overbroad, and therefore not unconstitutional, stating that.
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[W]e believe that the overbreadth of the statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. It
is our view that section 818 is not substantially overbroad and that whatever
overbreadth may exist should be cured throu^ case-by-case analysis of the fact
situations and to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.
Broadrick. 413 U.S. at 618.
The Court concluded that the statute should not be discarded, “in toto because some
persons’ arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute.” Id. at
615. The Court, therefore, held that the statute was constitutional. Id
Likewise, the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits held the CPPA to be
constitutional, because of the government’s interests in deterring the direct abuse of children and
destroying the illicit child pom trade, was deemed to be legitimate in relation to its overbreadth.
Hilton. 167 F.3d at 72-73; Mento. 231 F.3d at 921-22; Fox, 248 F.3d at 404-06; Acheson, 195
F.3d at 650-52. These courts held that the CPPA does not infringe upon or have the potential to
inftinge upon constitutionally protected speech. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 71. For example, in Hilton,
the court recognized that the “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” language expanded
the scope of the CPPA to a point where it may capture constitutionally protected speech,
rendering the statute invalid and chilling protected speech. Id. However, this court and other
circuit courts held that even though the statute on its face might pose constitutional difficulties.
Congress’s statements provide, “a precise and limited understanding of the ‘appears to be’
language.” M. The court in Hilton ruled that, ‘“[w]here a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other
of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.’” Id. (quoting United States
ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,408 (1909)).
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Therefore, the First Circuit and the other courts of appeal looked to the congressional
record to determine if the language used in the statute targeted a narrow class of images. Hilton,
167 F.3d at 71. The legislative record aims at a narrow range of images, “which are virtually
indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from un-retouched photographs of actual children
engaging in identical sexual conduct.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 7. The “appears to be” language,
“applies to the same type of photographic images already prohibited, but which does not require
the use of an actual minor in its production.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358 at 21. The prohibition of child
pornography was extended from, “photographic depictions of actual minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct to the identical type of depiction, one which is virtually indistinguishable from
the banned photographic depiction.” Id The Senate Reports narrow the statute so that the CPPA
is constitutional.
The CPPA Is Sufficiently Related To The Substantial, Indeed Compelling,
Government Interest In Safeguarding Children.
However, the Ninth Circuit also held that the, “CPPA is insufficiently related to the
interest in prohibiting pornography actually involving minors to justify its infringement on
protected speech.” The court, however, relies on a restrictive reading of Ferber. 458 U.S. 747.
The Court in Ferber upheld a New York state statute that prohibited the distribution of child
pornography involving real children in sexually explicit conduct. Id. The Court further ruled
that, “[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government
objective of surpassing importance.” Id. at 757. In a subsequent case, the Court agreed that the
goal of child pornography statutes should be “safeguarding the physical and psychological well
being of children,” and that the extension of this goal should be the termination of the child
pornography market. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103 at 109. The Court in Ferber and Osborne,
therefore, agreed that the ultimate goal was the safeguarding of children.
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Recently, however, the government’s goal to safeguard children has been threatened due
to advances and availability in computer technology. Four circuit courts of appeal permitted the
extension of Ferber and Osborne’s reasoning to allow the CPPA to regulate pornography that
contains images that appear to be children or convey the impression that a child was used in
production. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 73; Menlo 231 F.3dat 921; Acheson 195 F.3d at 651; Fox. 248
F.3d at 403-404. As the Senate Reports confirm, these “virtual” depictions can be readily used
to fiirther the child pornography trade and facilitate the seduction and abuse of children. Sen.
Rpt. 104-358, at 8-9. The legislative history also reports that technology has improved and
increased so much that it may be impossible to determine whether a real child was used in the
creation of the images. Id. at 17. The efforts to eradicate the child pornography market would
be frustrated if the statute did not extend to images that appear to be or convey the impression of
children. If the government were not allowed to prosecute images that are virtually
indistinguishable from real images, *hen the alleged pomographer would have a built-in defense
that the government cannot prove that the image circulating is that of a real individual.
Technology will hinder the government from doing its job and allow pomographers to go free.
Therefore, the government’s interest in addressing these forms of virtual child
pornography is no less powerful than when actual children are harmed during production. The
ultimate goal of safeguarding children, presented in the Supreme Court cases of Ferber and
Osborne, is also at the heart of the CPPA of 1996.
C.

It is Unlikely That Educational. Medical. Or Artistic Work Would Be Within The
Reach Of The CPPA, But Even If Some Protected Speech Were Captured These
Images Could Be Reviewed On A Case-Bv-Case Basis.

It is also not problematic that the CPPA might reach a small amount of protected speech.
167 F.3d at 71. The Court in Ferber. for example, rejected an overbreadth challenge to a New
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York state statute that prohibited the distribution of child pornography involving real children in
sexually explicit conduct. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773. The Court held that the statute was, “directed
at the hard core of child pornography” and it did not view the possibility that some protected
speech might be covered as a reason to hold the statute invalid. Id The Court explained that
only a tiny fraction of educational, medical, or artistic work would be within the statute’s reach
and that if overbreadth did exist in these situations that it should be cured by a “case-by-case
analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions may not be applied.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at
773-74. The Court in Ferber went on to say that, “if it were necessary for literary or artistic
value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps looks younger could be utilized.” Id. at 763.
Thus, the Court would have to review the use of the images for literary, artistic or scientific
worth on a case-by-case basis.
The reasoning applied in Ferber can be applied to the CPPA of 1996 and was applied by
four circuit courts. Like the statute in Ferber, the CPPA is aimed at hard core pornography that
includes depictions of sexual intercourse, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals, etc.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (2000). The CPPA does not apply to the “innocuous depiction of a minor”.
Sen. Rpt. 104-358 at 20. In addition, the CPPA applies to visual materials but does not cover
drawings, cartoons, sculptures and paintings of youthful looking persons in sexual poses,
because these images are not virtually indistinguishable from an image of an actual minor.
However, if an adult model were needed to simulate the sexual behavior of a child for a literary,
artistic or scientific reason then the social value of these works must be weighed against the
government’s interest in protecting children. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 763. The social value of these
works would probably be far from the hardest core of pornography. As Justice Brennan stated in
his concurrence in Ferber. the government’s interest in protecting children “is likely to be far less

compelling” when “the depiction is a serious contribution to art or science.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at
776. Thus, as in Ferber, any overbreadth that may exist can be cured on a case-by-case analysis.
Finally, the court in Hilton was also concerned that the statute would cover a substantial
amount of adult-oriented material because the phrase “appears to be a minor” criminalizes
possession of adult pornography created with models over the age of majority who look
youthful. 167 F.3d 61 at 71. However, as the court in Hilton stated, the main flaw in the
appellant's argument was its focus on teenagers that are just under the age of majority. The court
was satisfied, by examining the legislative history of the statute, that the majority of prosecutions
would involve images of pre-pubescent children or persons who otherwise clearly appear to be
under the age of eighteen. Id. at 73.
The Legislature has determined that the purveyors of child pornography usually cater to
pedophiles, who by definition have a taste for pre-pubertal children. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 21.
Adult material would not fall into this category. The court in Hilton finally determined that while
the prosecution of individuals that sell or possess images of young-looking adults might occur, it
is unlikely that it would be a substantial portion of prosecutions. The defense is consistent with
the congressional aim to protect children and not target adult material. Id. at 21.
D.

The Affirmative Defense And Scienter Requirement Further Lessen Anv
Overbreadth Concerns.

The prosecution of individuals, who sell or possess images of youthful looking adults and
any potential overbreadth problems are further lessened by other provisions provided for in the
CPPA. First, the CPPA offers an affirmative defense for the production of explicit material made
with a person of suitable age. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000). If an actual person or persons were
engaging in sexually explicit conduct, then the defense provides:
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[I]f each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; and the
defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the material
in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is or contains a visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000).
The affirmative defense goes hand in hand with Congress’s view that the CPPA does not
and is not intended to apply to images that use adults engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Sen.
Rpt. 104-358, at 21.
However, this defense does not extend to possessors of child pornography. In cases of
possession, the government must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed child
pornography. This scienter requirement, necessitates a showing that the individual purposefully
acquired or distributed the material, but that the individual did so believing that the material was
sexually explicit in nature and that it depicted a person who appeared to him to be (or that he
anticipated would be) under 18 years of age. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 at 75. The scienter
requirement thus, “limits the scope of the [statute] because the desire for prosecutorial efficiency
dictates the vast majority of prosecutions...would involve images of prepubescent children or
persons who otherwise clearly appear to be under the age of 18.” Acheson. 195 F.3d at 651-652Furthermore, the court in Hilton stated that the danger of persons being convicted for possessing
sexually explicit material of adults that look youthful is overstated in light of Congress’s
determination that purveyors of child pornography “usually cater to pedophiles, who by
definition have a predilection for prepubescent children. 167 F.3d at 73-74. The defense is
consistent with Congress’s aim that the law, “does not, and is not intended to, apply to a
depiction produced using adults engaging in sexually explicit conduct, even where a depicted
individual may appear to be a minor.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 21.

30

IV.

THE CPPA IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE IT PROVIDES
ADEQUATE NOTICE AND OBJECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
The CPPA is not void for vagueness because it meets the two pronged test put forth by

the United States Supreme Court decision in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). A
statute is void for vagueness if it fails to “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender, 461 U.S. 357. In this case,
Lawson was arrested and convicted for violating a California statute requiring persons who loiter
or wander the streets to provide a credible and reliable identification and to account for their
presence when requested by police. Id. at 353. The Supreme Court held that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague because if failed to clarify what was contemplated by the requirement
that a suspect have credible and reliable identification. I^ The Court agreed that the statute
does not require “impossible standards” of clarity. Id. at 358. The Court concluded that the
statute did not have standards for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy these
requirements, leaving it up to the police to decide whether the suspect has satisfied the statute.
Id, at 360. Thus, the loitering statute did not provide notice and was held to be void for
vagueness
A.

The CPPA Provides Adequate Notice When Examining The Purpose And Context
Surrounding The CPPA.

Certainly, a statute must provide adequate notice as was held in the Kolender case.
However, as the Court in Kolender also ruled, the statute does not require “impossible standards”
of clarity. Another Supreme Court case concurred with this principle. This Court concluded
that a state anti-noise ordinance was not impermissibly vague, because statutes are,
“[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our
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language.” Gravned v, City of Rockford^ 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). The Court duly noted that

terms in the ordinance like “tend to disturb” or “adjacent” could appear vague.

at 110.

However, because the purpose of the ordinance, “for the protection of schools”, and its context,
“school grounds and activities”, the Court concluded that the ordinance was clear. Id at 112.
The Court also recognized that there might be situations that arise questioning the meaning of the
terms in the statute. “Tt will always be true that the fertile legal imagination can conjure up
hypothetical cases in which the meaning of (disputed) terms will be in nice question.’” Id. at
110 (quoting American Communications Assn, v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)). But, the
Court held that a vagueness challenge cannot succeed by merely showing the possibility of an
impermissible application. Id. at 114. Thus, although there might be uncertainties when
examining the statute and situations that may arise to cause uncertainties, vagueness problems
will disappear if meaning can be tied to the purpose and context in which the statute operates.
Such is the case in the CPPA that any interested individual who believes certain terms to
be vague will know what is prohibited conduct by examining the purpose and context of the
statute. First, the CPPA’s “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” provisions satisfy the
standard of notice even though they aopear to be vague. By examining the purpose and context
of the legislative history, it is clear that both provisions apply only to, “material that is virtually
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in Acheson concluded that a reasonable person is on
notice that possessing images appearing to be children engaged in sexually explicit conduct is
illegal. 195 F.3d at 652. Furthermore, terms such as minor and sexually explicit activity are
precisely defined in the statute. The statute also categorizes conduct that is banned: pictures of
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actual minors, altered pictures of actual minors, pictures appearing to be minors and pictures that
are represented as minors. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 652. The statute, therefore, is not understood to
criminalize any sexual explicit depictions that are not virtually indistinguishable from
photographs of child pornography. Even if someone conjured up a hypothetical situation that did
infringe upon protected adult pornography, this Court has stated that the vagueness challenge
cannot succeed by showing the possibility of an impermissible application. The purpose and
context of the statute and the definitional language of the statute therefore give an ordinary
person notice.
B.

The CPPA Is Objective So That Enforcement Of The Statute Will Not Be
Arbitrary.

The language “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” is objective so that law
enforcement can enforce the statute fairly. The First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have all
held that the key language of the statute is not subjective but objective and is therefore not
subject to discriminatory enforcement. As stated above, in the section concerning overbreadth,
the legislative history shows that “appears to be” was intended to cover images, “which are
virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from un-retouched photographs of actual
children engaging in identical sexual conduct.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 7. This objective standard,
coupled with provisions of enforcement, allow the CPPA to be enforced in an objective manner.
It is well settled law that objective determinations based on a person’s appearance or
actions are routinely accepted in court. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972). In the Miller v.
California case, the Supreme Court was deciding whether the state could regulate the work of the
defendant who was convicted of mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material. Id. at 15. The
Court held that the state could regulate work, where taken as a whole, “appeals to the prurient
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interest in sex ...Miller. 413 U.S. at 24. The Court further held that in order to determine if a
work appeals to prurient interest that the guidelines would be for an average person to examine
the material applying contemporary community standards. Id. The Court concluded that it was
acceptable to use such a standard based on appearance and that this was an objective
determination. Id.
As in the state statute in Miller, a trier of fact under the CPPA must objectively decide,
based on the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable unsuspecting viewer would
consider the depiction to be of an actual individual under the age of eighteen engaged in sexual
activity. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75. The jury must then determine, based on the evidence, whether a
reasonable viewer would consider the depiction to be of an actual minor. The jury must also
decide whether the image was marketed so as to “convey the impression” that the image was
made with minors. Id. Both of these jury determinations are based on an objective reasonable
person standard that can be handled in a variety of ways.
For example, the trier of fact may simply examine the physical characteristics of the
person to determine age. |d. at 76. If. however, the minor has already reached puberty, then
perhaps an expert witness may testify as to the physical development of the depicted person. li
Evidence may also be introduced that explores how the disk, file or video was labeled or marked
by the creator, distributor or possessor. Id The Fifth Circuit, for example, found that it is a
custom of the child pornography trade to name a computer file with a name like “Falcon 10”, and
that the number refers to the age of the person depicted in the file, which might aid in
determining the age of the minors. U.S. v. Fox. 248 F.3d 348,407 (5th Cir. 2001). Finally, the
Fourth Circuit held that the manner in which the pornography was created, promoted or
distributed is determinative of status as child pornography. Mento. 231 F.3d 912,922 (4th Cir-
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2000). If the presentation were such that it, “conveyed the impression” that the image was of
one or more minors, that would provide an independent basis for conviction. Mento, 231 F.3d at
922. But, as the Mento court also noted, “it would be the jury’s responsibility to ensure that a
reasonable person would understand the specific impression sought to be conveyed.” Id. As the
court in Hilton slated, “[w]hile this list is hardly exhaustive, it gives a flavor of the ways in
which a depicted person’s apparent age might be objectively proven.” Id.
A further safeguard against arbitrary legal enforcement is that the prosecution must
establish the element of scienter to get a conviction. U.S. v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S.
64, 78 (1994). In the X-Citement case, the Supreme Court held that the scienter term
“knowingly” as used in the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act, applied to
elements of crime concerning minority of performers and sexually explicit nature of material. Id.
at 64. The Court admitted that it was not clear from the statute that the scienter requirement
applied to both the minority of the performers and the nature of the material. I^ at 78.
However, the Court turned to Congressional reports that indicated that the scienter requirement
also extends to the age of performers. Id The Court concluded that in order to erase serious
constitutional doubts about the statute that the scienter requirement would have to apply to the
age of performers. M.
The reasoning in X-Citement Video, to extend the scienter requirement to both the age of
the performers and the sexually explicit nature of the material, is the way in which the CPPA
must also be interpreted to erase any constitutional doubts. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2000) of
the CPPA establishes that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an
“individual” knowingly possessed the child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) applies only
to a person who knowingly receives or distributes child pornography. As the statute in 2^
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Citement Video, the CPPA likewise provides that the government must prove not only that an
individual purposeftilly acquired or distributed the material, but that he did so believing that the
material was sexually explicit in nature and that it depicted a person who appeared to him to be
under eighteen years of age. Hilton. 167F.3dat75. Therefore, a defendant who honestly
believes that an individual depicted in the image appeared to be eighteen years old or older, or
can prove that the image was created with a youthful-looking adult, must be acquitted, unless the
image was presented or marketed as if it contained a real minor. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75. The
scienter requirement is therefore another protection against arbitrary enforcement of the CPPA.
Finally, the affirmative defense is yet another added measure against arbitrary
enforcement. The affirmative defense is given if the person depicted actually was an adult at the
time the image was created. The fact that the person in the image was eighteen years of age, will
likely lead to a dismissal of the cha^'ge. The affirmative defense is provided for those sellers,
producers and distributors who allegedly promoted, advertised, presented, described or
distributed their material to convey the impression that it contained visual depictions of child
pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(c). Therefore, this defense does not extend to possessors
unless the possessor has less than three images that were promptly destroyed or reported the
images to law enforcement. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d). However, the government still has to prove
the scienter requirement about what an individual believed to be the age of the depicted person if
they possess child pornography. Thus, if the defendant can show that he honestly believed that
the person depicted was above 18 years of age, or can prove the person was over the age of
majority than there must be an acquittal, unless the image was presented or marketed as child
pornography.
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V.

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IS A FORM OF SPEECH THAT SHOULD NOT BE
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
While the First Amendment provides broad protection for free speech rights, the Supreme

Court has recognized that some types of speech are wholly without First Amendment protection.
In Chaolinskv v. New Hampshire, the Court laid the foundation for the excision of obscenity
from the protection of the First Amendment:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene .... It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefits that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.
315 U.S. 568,571 (1942).
The First Amendment to the Constitution, therefore, does not protect all speech. Speech
must have some socially redeeming value to warrant Constitutional protection. Obscenity,
fighting words, and child pornography are all historical examples of speech that this Court has
declined to provide such protection. Child pornography has no social value, whether produced
with real children or otherwise.
The Court held that child pornography is another category of speech outside the ambit of
First Amendment protection. New York v. Ferbcr, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Court articulated
the state interest in protecting children as a policy rationale for denying First Amendment
protection to child pornography. Id at 749. In Ferber. the Supreme Court intimated that child
pornography is worse than "mere" obscenity. Id The Court decided that a state should be
granted more leeway to prevent the harmful effects of child pornography than it has in cases of
adult pornography. Id Essentially, although the Court applied a strict scrutiny test, it decided
that the compelling interest in protecting children would almost always outweigh First
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Amendment interests, thereby justifying a categorical denial of First Amendment protection to
child pornography in virtually every case. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749.
The Senate Reports for the CPPA extends the Ferber rationale to computer-generated
images. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 19. These “virtual” images do not deserve First Amendment
protection because, “the State’s compelling interest in protecting children is directly advanced by
prohibiting the possession or distribution of such material, for many of the same reasons
applicable to the child pomographir material at issue in Ferber.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 19.
These objectives for eradicating “real” child pornography are one in the same for “virtual” child
pornography. As stated before in Ferber. the state has a compelling interest to safeguard the
physical and psychological well-being of children. Id at 761. Children will be protected when
there is a halt to the distribution of images depicting children in sexual activity because it is
related to the sexual abuse of children. Id. at 762. Whether the images are real or virtual does
not matter to pedophiles, who will use the images to stimulate and whet their appetites. Sen.
Rpt. 104-358, at 19. Computer-generated images, which appear to be a minor or convey the
impression that minors are depicted in sexually explicit conduct, are just as dangerous to the
well-being of children as material produced using actual children. Id
Thus, the production of this obscene speech causes harm to real children directly, if they
are part of the production process, or indirectly because pedophiles use such material to whet
their appetites and to seduce children to ultimately abuse them. “Virtual” child pornography
should not be given more protection than “real” child pornography. In the final analysis, the
visual depictions of child pornography, as defined under the CPPA, are without the protection of
the First Amendment and are the appropriate target of government regulation to eradicate this
market.
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CONCLUSION
The CPPA is a content-neutral statute that is not overbroad or void for vagueness. The
CPPA is content-neutral because it prevents the secondary effects of the child pornography
industry, including the exploitation and degradation of children and the encouragement of
pedophilia and molestation of children. However, even if the CPPA is considered to be content
based, four circuit courts of appeal have correctly held that it is narrowly tailored to serve
compelling government interests. Furthermore, the CPPA is not overbroad because it does not
reach depictions that are not at the hard core of child pornography. However, in the case that the
statute does reach a tiny fraction of educational, medical, artistic or other protected speech the
overbreadth may be cured on a case-by-case analysis. Finally, the CPPA is not void for
vagueness because persons of ordinary intelligence can distinguish whether a depiction is
virtually indistinguishable from a photo of a real child engaging in sexually explicit activity.
Secondly, the statute will not be arbitrarily enforced because it is based on objective standards.
For the foregoing reasons. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court REVERSE the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and hold that the CPPA
passes constitutional muster. Specifically, sections 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) should not be
omitted from the statute.
Dated: November 1,2001
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